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13 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
cjkas
0ee52d6d9f fix: close the token bypass below a route, review fixes for 4b
The routes matched any path below them, and a web asset name there
passed the token check: GET /backup/a.js returned the backup under
Secured. Every route is now an exact match, and a web asset sits in
the root only.

- e2e: those paths answer 401 or 404; the restore test now fails when
  the chunks skip the token check (checked with the check removed).
- WEB_CORS lets the socket take Origin: null instead of skipping the
  Origin check.
- ADR 0006, GLOSSARY and README: the Origin check in either mode, /ws
  as a public route, the Host header behind a reverse proxy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 19:39:51 +01:00
cjkas
ecb0260f61 feat!: the token on every route, Secure Config Only goes (step 4b)
Under Secured every HTTP route but the public ones needs the token
(docs/adr/0006-two-security-modes-eleven-http-routes.md):
- isPublicRoute, isWebAsset and originMatchesHost in src/HttpAccess.h,
  with native tests.
- One middleware checks the token. It runs once the body is in, so
  /restore, /updateFirmware and /updateApplication check it on their
  first chunk and drop a refused upload.
- Static serving answers the web UI's files only: shades.cfg and
  shades.tmp are no longer served.
- The wildcard CORS headers go; WEB_CORS turns them back on for UI work
  from file://.
- The socket refuses a handshake whose Origin doesn't name its Host.
- "Secure Config Only" goes: a device set to it is Secured, and
  /loginContext drops permissions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 23:03:59 +01:00
cjkas
2a954aa158 feat!: remove the old API, ports 8081 and 8080 (step 4a)
Step 4a of docs/SECURITY_PLAN.md. Port 80 keeps the eleven HTTP routes of
ADR 0006 and the socket at /ws; everything else moved to protocol 2.

- Port 8081 (ApiRoutes) and the socket on 8080 (SocketEmitter) are gone.
  Protocol 2 owns its frame buffer and loop-task check.
- Port 80 drops every route the old web UI called: reads, edits,
  settings, scans, reboot, /shades.cfg, /discovery. HttpRoutes.cpp holds
  what stays.
- ModelSnapshot, SnapshotSlots and the read documents are gone. The item
  snapshot types stay, as ItemSnapshot, for events, MQTT and the command
  replies.
- Model edits reply only to their protocol 2 op: requestResult goes.
- The settings' toJSON writers, used only by the settings routes, go.
- The _espsomfy_rts._tcp mDNS record moves to port 80, with path=/ws.
- The memory event reports the loop-rate window it closes.
- A deleted room no longer re-publishes its retained MQTT topics.
- e2e: the heap check reads the sync's status; the sync is checked on
  its own instead of against /controller.
- README gets an API and ports section.

BREAKING CHANGE: ports 8081 and 8080 and the old HTTP routes are gone.
Home Assistant needs integration 3.0.0 or newer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 21:49:38 +01:00
cjkas
43191ba312 feat: sign tokens with a secret key, compare them in constant time
Tokens were HMAC(serverId, credentials + client IP). serverId is public
(mDNS, MQTT, /loginContext), so anyone who saw a token could test PIN
guesses offline. The key is now 32 random bytes made on first boot in
their own NVS namespace, which no settings save clears and no backup
holds. It is made before WiFi starts, from the bootloader's entropy
source.

Tokens are compared with tokenMatches, which takes the same time
whatever the guess, on the apikey header, the socket upgrade and
/login.

createAPIToken never freed its mbedtls context, so every token it made
leaked: 563 bytes per login on the device, until it ran out of memory
after about 150 logins. It now frees it: 0 bytes over 500 logins.

Every token made before the upgrade is refused once. The web UI asks
for login again, and Home Assistant 3.0 logs in again by itself.

Closes #80

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 19:41:43 +01:00
cjkas
ff7517e10f fix: review findings on the login throttle
- The throttle runs on a 64-bit clock in ms (esp_timer_get_time()), so a
  slot left alone for 49.7 days isn't brought back by millis() wrapping
  round to its old failure.
- Web.cpp turns the client into the throttle's key in one place, and
  says that an IPv6 client would share key 0; names are clearer
  (retryMs, vacantSlot).
- The shared slot's test now succeeds from the IP counted in it, so a
  success that cleared the shared slot would fail it.
- GLOSSARY.md names it the login throttle, with lockouts, and
  SECURITY_PLAN.md and ADR 0006 use that name.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-27 18:44:39 +01:00
cjkas
bab83313ee feat: throttle failed logins per client IP
PR C of SECURITY_PLAN.md: after 5 failed /login attempts an IP is refused
for 30 s, and each failure after that refuses it for twice as long, up
to 15 min. A success resets it, as does an hour without a failure.

- LoginThrottle.h holds the schedule and 8 IPs, with the time passed in
  so native tests cover it. While all 8 hold recent failures, every
  other IP shares one more slot, so many addresses don't each get five
  free tries.
- A refused IP gets 429 with Retry-After before its credentials are
  checked, so a right guess during a lockout reveals nothing. Home
  Assistant retries a 429 instead of asking for new credentials.
- The web UI's login panel shows a 401's or 429's message, where it
  popped a service error.
- test/e2e --lockout checks it on a Secured device and waits it out.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-26 22:08:30 +01:00
cjkas
096eef0581 fix: settings ops review findings
- The frequency scan ops and reboot run on loop() like every op (ADR 0005).
  endFrequencyScan goes to the front of the loop queue, so it never waits
  behind an unpair that waits for the scan to end.
- A security save that leaves the device Secured, or changes its mode,
  closes every client, the saver too once its reply has gone. None to None
  closes nobody.
- proto must be a radio_proto value; frequency, rxBandwidth and deviation
  are checked against what the CC1101 can be set to.
- wifiNetworks sends fewer networks instead of none when they don't fit.
- A client WiFi scan doesn't start while the device joins a network.
- rebootTime is set before reboot; cancelSettingsSave is freeSettingsSave.
- PROTOCOL.md: pins that may be -1, and the fields the routes sent that
  moved elsewhere. e2e: the WiFi scan test goes by the connection in use.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-25 10:27:53 +01:00
cjkas
2517f40709 feat: settings ops, the WiFi and frequency scans, and reboot for socket protocol 2
Step 1d of the protocol 2 core (docs/SECURITY_PLAN.md).

- getSettings/saveSettings by section: general, network, mqtt, security,
  radio. A save is the settings route's request, so loop() applies it with
  the settings' own fromJSON(). ProtoSettings checks every field first:
  kind, range, string length, IP addresses.
- Secrets are only reported as has*. A security save replies with the
  client's new token and closes the other sockets; other saves send
  settingsChanged to the other clients.
- scanWifi runs an async scan from ESPNetwork, kept apart from the roaming
  scan, and wifiNetworks goes to the clients that asked.
- beginFrequencyScan, endFrequencyScan and reboot run at once on async_tcp,
  as their routes do: a scan's end mustn't wait in the loop queue behind an
  unpair that waits for the scan to end (new op kind 'a').
- e2e: test_settings.py and a --reboot flag.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-25 09:52:09 +01:00
cjkas
77237111ea feat: edit ops and the reads their forms need, for socket protocol 2
The edit routes become ops 26-44 (addRoom ... groupSortOrder): ProtoEdits
turns an op's payload into the route's request, full names and real
booleans, and loop() applies it with applyModelEdit() as the route
does. The reply goes to the client that sent it, with an add's new id,
or the route's reason and a shade's validation code; the HTTP routes
keep sending requestResult.

getNextRoom, getNextShade, getNextGroup and groupOptions (45-48) are
answered by loop() from the shade model, through a new LoopQueue item.

Messages that arrive in pieces, a frame over one TCP segment or several
frames, are put back together by ProtoAssembly: one at a time across
clients, up to 4 KB, in a buffer held only while one is on its way.
A message in pieces is now told from its first frame's opcode, which
also stops a fragmented message's last frame drawing a second reply.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 14:29:53 +02:00
cjkas
dc2f1478b6 fix: protocol 2 core review findings
From the review of #99:
- A sync could stall when a client took a slot the moment another left:
  loop() used up the new client's sync on the old one. The slots move
  to ProtoSlots, a pure module with native tests, and loop() takes a
  slot's wants only for the client it read (takeWants).
- Deleting a group sends its shades, whose inGroup changed. Deleting a
  shade unlinks it from its groups and sends them, so a new shade given
  its id doesn't join them.
- next and sync with an id get an ok reply, and a message in pieces
  gets one bad request, not one per piece.
- Feeds check for loop() before they write the event buffer, and log
  an event too large, as events do.
- editChanges() (ModelEditor, native tests) says what clients get after
  an edit; the edit result carries the shade a group gained or lost.
  order() takes a sort_list_t.
- The frame writers move to ProtoFrame. Renames: pf to proto_field_t,
  the X-macro letters to TYPE/FIELD/ERR/FEED, proto_request_t to
  proto_message_t, REQ_* to WANTS_*, fmt to eventJson. The event
  bodies share sendItem(), the connection type name lives in
  ESPNetwork, and the loop() task check in SocketEmitter.
- e2e: the heap floor check skips when the low since boot is already
  under it; tests for replies to next and sync and a long message.
- SECURITY_PLAN.md splits step 1 into 1a-1d.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-24 13:17:15 +02:00
cjkas
e25747d395 docs: ADRs 0005-0007 for socket protocol 2
ADR 0005: the web UI and Home Assistant talk to the device over one
websocket protocol (ops on loop(), sync with next, a JSON envelope a
binary encoding can reuse, short keys described by a schema).
ADR 0006: two security modes and eleven HTTP routes on port 80.
ADR 0007: the firmware no longer updates itself from GitHub.

ADR 0002 is amended: its single-writer rule stands, but edits now get
one reply and reads no longer go through a ModelSnapshot.
SECURITY_PLAN.md is revised to match, and keeps the token key, login
backoff, CORS and Origin work. PROTOCOL.md starts as an outline, and
GLOSSARY.md gains the socket protocol and security terms.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-22 20:50:33 +02:00
cjkas
a1622e652d build: move to pioarduino 55.03.312 (Arduino 3.3.12, ESP-IDF 5.5)
IDF 4.4 gets no more security fixes, and the planned RMT radio needs
IDF 5's RMT driver.  See docs/adr/0003-pioarduino-idf55.md.

- Every env on one pinned pioarduino release.  C6 drops its own
  library list and flags but stays a debug build on huge_app.
- Release envs build at CORE_DEBUG_LEVEL=2 so the ESP32 image fits its
  1.5 MB OTA slot (17 KB free); debug envs stay at 3.
- Drop the C3: its image is 76.5 KB over the OTA slot on IDF 5.5.
- CI installs pioarduino's Core and checks firmware.bin against the app
  partition, failing under 8 KB free.  PlatformIO's "Flash:" figure
  reads ~45 KB low and passed a C3 image that doesn't fit.
- esp_task_wdt_reconfigure(): on 3.x the core already starts the watchdog
  and esp_task_wdt_init() fails, so the C6 build kept the 5 s default.
- An updated firmware is kept only once it has run 60 s with the
  network up; a reset before then rolls back to the previous one.
- ETH.begin() takes the 3.x argument order; Arduino 2.x branches gone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-19 22:05:22 +02:00
cjkas
04cb97e3bf docs: plan auth on every entry point and one HTTP server
SECURITY_PLAN.md records the agreed design: an access table for port 80
and the 8081 alias, websocket handshake auth, CORS removal, a random
token key, /login throttling, and moving API and websocket to port 80.
KNOWN_ISSUES.md gets an entry for each open issue it fixes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-18 20:08:20 +02:00