- Load the token key in Web::startup(), before either web server starts,
so no token can be made with the all-zero key; log a failed
pref.begin().
- createAPIToken checks mbedtls' return codes. On a failure it leaves
the token empty, which tokenMatches never accepts, instead of hex
from uninitialised stack.
- API_TOKEN_SIZE in ApiToken.h replaces the five char[65] buffers; the
HMAC's description moves to createAPIToken, with the None form.
- handleLogin builds the candidate token once and compares it once.
- e2e: the serverId test skips on `secured` like its neighbours, names
its values, and says it assumes the device sees this PC's address.
- KNOWN_ISSUES keeps #81, which #108 removes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tokens were HMAC(serverId, credentials + client IP). serverId is public
(mDNS, MQTT, /loginContext), so anyone who saw a token could test PIN
guesses offline. The key is now 32 random bytes made on first boot in
their own NVS namespace, which no settings save clears and no backup
holds. It is made before WiFi starts, from the bootloader's entropy
source.
Tokens are compared with tokenMatches, which takes the same time
whatever the guess, on the apikey header, the socket upgrade and
/login.
createAPIToken never freed its mbedtls context, so every token it made
leaked: 563 bytes per login on the device, until it ran out of memory
after about 150 logins. It now frees it: 0 bytes over 500 logins.
Every token made before the upgrade is refused once. The web UI asks
for login again, and Home Assistant 3.0 logs in again by itself.
Closes#80
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
