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ci: signed release provenance, pinned dependencies, security scanning
- Release files get a SHA256SUMS file and a Sigstore-signed build provenance attestation (gh attestation verify). - The workflows read the repo only. A new release job, which runs no build tools, is the only one that can write: it uploads the files with gh and pushes the version bump. The third-party release actions are gone. - Every action is pinned to a commit SHA, esptool and the libraries to exact versions. The release tag reaches the shell through env, and set_version.sh rejects tags that aren't versions. - New workflows: CodeQL (C++ via the native build, JS, Python, Actions), OpenSSF Scorecard, zizmor. Dependabot moves the action pins. - SECURITY.md: private reporting, checking a download. README badges. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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SECURITY.md
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SECURITY.md
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# Security
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## Reporting a vulnerability
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Please don't open a public issue. Report it privately through [GitHub's vulnerability reporting](https://github.com/cjkas/ESPSomfy-RTS/security/advisories/new) and give the firmware version, the board, and the steps to reproduce it.
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Fixes go into the latest release only, so check that the problem is still there in it.
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The Home Assistant integration has [its own repo](https://github.com/cjkas/ESPSomfy-RTS-HA) and its own reporting page.
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## What the device protects against
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The device is meant for a local network. In the Secured mode every route and the socket need a login. The threat model, what is in scope and what isn't, is in [docs/SECURITY_PLAN.md](docs/SECURITY_PLAN.md) and [ADR 0006](docs/adr/0006-two-security-modes-eleven-http-routes.md). Don't expose the device to the internet.
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## Checking a download
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Each release file (`.bin`, `.zip`) comes with a signed attestation that this repo's [build workflow](.github/workflows/build.yaml) built it from the release's commit. Check one with the [GitHub CLI](https://cli.github.com/):
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```
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gh attestation verify SomfyController.ino.esp32.bin --repo cjkas/ESPSomfy-RTS
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```
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Or compare the checksums with the release's `SHA256SUMS` file:
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```
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sha256sum --check --ignore-missing SHA256SUMS
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```
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Releases before 4.0.2 have neither.
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## How the build is kept clean
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- Every action in the workflows is pinned to a commit, and libraries to exact versions. Dependabot proposes action updates after a week's cooldown.
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- The workflows can only read the repo by default. Only the release job can write, and it runs no build tools.
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- [CodeQL](.github/workflows/codeql.yml) scans the C++, the web UI, the Python scripts and the workflows on every PR. [zizmor](.github/workflows/zizmor.yml) lints the workflows, and [OpenSSF Scorecard](.github/workflows/scorecard.yml) rates the repo's practices. Findings are on the repo's Security tab.
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