ci: signed release provenance, pinned dependencies, security scanning

- Release files get a SHA256SUMS file and a Sigstore-signed build
  provenance attestation (gh attestation verify).
- The workflows read the repo only. A new release job, which runs no
  build tools, is the only one that can write: it uploads the files with
  gh and pushes the version bump. The third-party release actions are gone.
- Every action is pinned to a commit SHA, esptool and the libraries to
  exact versions. The release tag reaches the shell through env, and
  set_version.sh rejects tags that aren't versions.
- New workflows: CodeQL (C++ via the native build, JS, Python, Actions),
  OpenSSF Scorecard, zizmor. Dependabot moves the action pins.
- SECURITY.md: private reporting, checking a download. README badges.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
cjkas 2026-10-31 13:27:48 +01:00
parent 8c7a2dee12
commit 5c57d1a2cd
9 changed files with 306 additions and 77 deletions

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name: zizmor
# Lints the workflows for security problems: unpinned actions, broad token
# permissions, template injection. Findings go to Security > Code scanning.
on:
push:
branches: [main]
pull_request:
paths:
- ".github/**"
permissions:
contents: read
jobs:
zizmor:
name: Workflow security
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
security-events: write
steps:
- name: Check out code
uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4.4.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Run zizmor
uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@53290badfa369cb0bf7ad16342cb62c2fa47ac7b # v0.8.0