ci: signed release provenance, pinned dependencies, security scanning

- Release files get a SHA256SUMS file and a Sigstore-signed build
  provenance attestation (gh attestation verify).
- The workflows read the repo only. A new release job, which runs no
  build tools, is the only one that can write: it uploads the files with
  gh and pushes the version bump. The third-party release actions are gone.
- Every action is pinned to a commit SHA, esptool and the libraries to
  exact versions. The release tag reaches the shell through env, and
  set_version.sh rejects tags that aren't versions.
- New workflows: CodeQL (C++ via the native build, JS, Python, Actions),
  OpenSSF Scorecard, zizmor. Dependabot moves the action pins.
- SECURITY.md: private reporting, checking a download. README badges.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
cjkas 2026-10-31 13:27:48 +01:00
parent 8c7a2dee12
commit 5c57d1a2cd
9 changed files with 306 additions and 77 deletions

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.github/dependabot.yml vendored Normal file
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# The workflows' actions are pinned to commit SHAs; Dependabot moves the pins.
# PlatformIO libraries aren't covered: bump lib_deps in platformio.ini by hand.
version: 2
updates:
- package-ecosystem: github-actions
directory: /
schedule:
interval: weekly
# A week for a hijacked release to be caught before it lands here.
cooldown:
default-days: 7
groups:
actions:
patterns: ["*"]